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Executive Summary 
The dispersion of $700 billion in loans by the Treasury through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) has been the subject of intense political debate. There has been considerable anger over 
what many people view as taxpayer subsidies to banks that bear partial responsibility for the housing 
bubble and the current recession.  
Remarkably there has been much less public attention on the far larger amount of money that has 
been distributed through special loan facilities created by the Federal Reserve Board over the last 
year. As of late February, the Fed had just over $1 trillion in loans outstanding through these ten 
facilities, plus the money lent to AIG. This sum is more than 40 percent larger than the amount that 
has been lent by the Treasury through the TARP.  
The Fed provides no information on the amount of the loans or the collateral provided by specific 
borrowers, making it impossible to determine the extent to which companies are using the facility or 
the extent to which they are being effectively subsidized by getting loans at below market interest 
rates.  
While most of the facilities cover hundreds or even thousands of institutions, the two facilities 
created to support primary dealers and investment banks, the Primary Credit Dealer Facility (PDCF) 
and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), have only 16 eligible institutions, which makes it 
possible to get a rough approximation of the size of the implicit subsidies associated with lending 
through these two facilities. 
This paper calculates the approximate subsidy each company received through these facilities, using 
the assumption that each institution borrowed from the Fed in proportion to its assets, and that the 
market interest rate available to these institutions would have been the interest rate charged on AA 
asset-backed commercial paper of the same duration as the loans from the Fed. 
Under these assumptions, the total subsidy on loans made through the PDCF through late February 
was $154 million. The largest beneficiaries, based on these calculations, were BNP Paribas Securities 
at $18 million, HSBC Securities at $17 million, and UBS Securities at $16 million. 
Through the TSLF, these assumptions show a total subsidy of $1,092 million. By the calculation 
described above, BNP Paribas Securities received an implicit subsidy of $122 million, HSBC 
Securities received a subsidy of $115 million, UBS Securities had a subsidy of $111 million, and 
Citigroup Global Markets got a $107 million subsidy. 
While these sums seem small compared to the hundreds of billions lent through the TARP, it is 
important to remember that these figures in principle refer to actual subsidies, not the loans that are 
made available through the TARP. Many of the loans offered through the TARP did involve a 
substantial subsidy component, but most of these loans will be repaid to the Treasury.1 
The actual subsidies for some of the banks were almost certainly far larger since some banks surely 
borrowed an amount that was disproportionate to their assets. Also, the most heavy users of these 
                                                 
1 See Congressional Oversight Panel, “February Oversight Report: Valuing Treasury’s Acquisitions,” available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-020609-report.pdf.  
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facilities were likely the ones that faced the most difficulty borrowing in private markets, so the 
actual subsidy received by some of these institutions can easily be several times larger than the 
number implied by these calculations. 
Beyond this limited group of institutions, there is a public interest in knowing which institutions are 
effectively being subsidized through the Fed’s lending facilities more generally. While the Fed’s 
lending may be serving a public purpose by sustaining otherwise solvent corporations through a 
liquidity crisis, the public may still want to know which institutions benefited from its largesse and to 
what extent. This information would be necessary if Congress were to impose some quid pro quo 
for receiving money from the Fed, comparable to what has been attempted with lending through the 
TARP. 
At this point, the corporations that borrow through the Fed’s facilities get access to loans at below 
market interest rates with no conditions whatsoever. The public should at least be aware that it is 
lending a substantial amount of money through this route.   
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Introduction 
In order to counteract the impact on solvency and liquidity of the banking sector’s housing-related 
losses, the Federal Reserve Board has created a variety of new loan facilities. These facilities make 
credit available to commercial banks, investment banks, and even non-financial corporations on 
more advantageous terms than are available in the private market. 
The ostensible purpose of these loan facilities is to maintain liquidity in the financial system and the 
larger economy. While this is an important public goal, these facilities also have an implicit subsidy 
component. The Fed is allowing a selected group of financial and non-financial institutions to 
effectively get loans at below market interest rates from the government.  
Allowing these institutions access to subsidized loans is distinct from the Fed’s normal lending 
through the discount window. That lending is made exclusively to banks that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System. They are obligated to keep reserves with the Fed, which until recently paid 
no interest. In addition, these banks must open their accounts to the Fed for regular scrutiny in a 
way that is not true of the beneficiaries of the Fed’s new loan facilities.  
In other words, there was a quid pro quo whereby the commercial banks that were members of the 
Federal Reserve System had to surrender some control (and interest) in exchange for access to 
below market loans through the discount window. In addition, the Fed makes public its loans 
through the discount window so analysts can determine the extent to which banks are taking 
advantage of this privilege in their assessment of a bank’s health. 
By contrast, the beneficiaries of the Fed’s new loan facilities are not being required to give up 
anything in return. They don’t have to keep reserves with the Fed. Nor are they subject to the same 
disclosure requirements as the commercial banks that are part of the Fed system. And their 
borrowing through the various Fed facilities is not disclosed to the public. 
Given the depths of the economic crisis, the creation of these special loan facilities may still be 
desirable policy. Certainly there is a public interest in minimizing disruptions to the financial system 
and ensuring that otherwise solvent companies have sufficient access to credit to meet their payroll 
and pay other bills.  
However, it is also important to recognize the subsidy elements that are implicit in the Fed’s lending 
facilities. All businesses recognize that under some circumstances they could face liquidity problems, 
even if their basic business model is sound. Many otherwise profitable businesses have failed 
because they could not arrange financing to get them through what otherwise would have been 
temporary problems. Others take costly steps to protect themselves against this risk, such as keeping 
large cash reserves or arranging substantial lines of credit.  
In short, liquidity is not free and when the Fed opts to make liquidity available to a select group of 
financial and non-financial institutions it is effectively giving these institutions a subsidy at the 
expense of the public at large. There are always other potential uses for the money loaned by the 
Fed. For example, the Fed could offer every household in the country $10,000 in credit card debt at 
below market interest rates. Instead of going this route, the Fed has chosen to lend through the 
various facilities established over the last year. 
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As of February 25, 2009, the Fed had a total of $1 trillion in loans outstanding through its various 
facilities as shown in Table 1.  
TABLE 1 
Special Lending Facilities of the Federal Reserve Board 
Name Beneficiaries Outstanding Loan Volume (millions)
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) Primary dealers $25,618
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) Primary dealers $112,170
Term Securities Lending Facility Options 
Program (TOP) Primary dealers $49,999
Term Auction Facility (TAF) Primary credit-eligible depository institutions $447,563
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
Depository institutions, bank holding 
companies, U.S. branches and agencies 
of foreign banks 
$11,382
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) Eligible commercial paper issuers $246,233
Money Market Investing Funding Facility 
(MMIFF) Eligible Money Market Mutual Funds $0
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF) 
All U.S. persons that own eligible 
collateral $0
Portfolio Holdings of Maiden Lane LLC - $72,242
Credit Extended to American International 
Group, Inc. - $38,046
TOTAL   $1,003,253
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
TSLF auction results available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/tslf/termseclending_Historical.cfm 
TOP auction results available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/top/topseclending_Historical.cfm 
Balance outstanding for TAF, PDCF, AMLF, TALF, and the AIG credit extension available through Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/hist/h41hist6.pdf 
Portfolio holdings of CPFF, MMIFF, and Maiden Lane LLC available through Federal Reserve’s balance sheet at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/hist/h41hist5.pdf 
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With $1 trillion outstanding, the Federal Reserve’s lending activity is more than 40 percent larger 
than the $700 billion in lending authorized through the TARP, as shown in Figure 1. This lending is 
likely to expand in the near future as several of these facilities get better established to support more 
lending. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Comparing Federal Reserve Lending to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
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The largest special lending facility created by the Fed has been the Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
which allows depository institutions that are members of the Federal Reserve System to borrow 
money for periods of either 28 or 84 days, with funds awarded through an auction mechanism. 
Unlike the discount window, borrowing through the TAF is not made public, nor are the assets 
accepted as collateral disclosed. As of late February 2009, this facility, which was created in the 
summer of 2007, accounted for approximately half of the outstanding loans through special Fed 
facilities, at $447.6 billion. 
The second largest facility is the commercial paper funding facility (CPFF). This facility was set up in 
October of 2008 to enhance liquidity in the commercial paper market by buying commercial paper 
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issued by corporations, including non-financial corporations. As of late February, the Fed had 
almost $246.2 billion outstanding through the CPFF. Together, the TAF and the CPFF accounted 
for more than three quarters of the outstanding loans from the special Fed facilities.  
The next three largest lending facilities were designed to support primary dealers and investment 
banks. The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) offers loans of 28 days through an auction 
process. The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) offers overnight loans. And the Term Securities 
Option Lending Program (TOP) auctions options for the right to borrow under the TSLF. As of 
late February, the Fed had $122.2 billion, $29.6 billion, and $50.0 billion in loans outstanding under 
these three programs, respectively. 
The Fed also designed a facility to support money market funds, the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), which has $11.4 billion in loans outstanding. 
There are also two newer facilities that had yet to start making loans as of this date, the Money 
Market Investing Funding Facility (MMIFF), which is designed to provide liquidity to money market 
mutual funds, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) that is intended to 
support the market for various types of asset-backed securities. 
In addition to the special facilities, the Fed has also issued loans to AIG through the Maiden Lane 
facilities. It also has guaranteed against losses on hundreds of billions of dollars of assets held by J.P. 
Morgan, Citigroup, and Bank of America. 
While the Fed releases aggregate data on the amount loaned through these facilities, it provides no 
information on how much individual banks or non-financial corporations have borrowed. It also 
does not disclose collateral for loans, which raises the possibility that the Fed did not get adequate 
capital in some instances, exposing it to greater risk and effectively implying a greater subsidy for the 
borrower. This lack of disclosure makes it impossible to directly determine the extent to which any 
specific company has benefited from the Fed’s actions. However, at least in the case of the two loan 
facilities for investment banks and primary dealers, the Primary Credit Dealer Facility (PDCF) and 
the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the relatively small number of eligible institutions 
makes it possible to get a rough approximation of the size of the implicit subsidies associated with 
these two facilities.2 The next section describes this calculation. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The TOP is not included in these calculations because it auctions options, not loans. This further complicates any 
effort to impute subsidies to eligible firms. 
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Calculating the Subsidies in the PDCF and the TSLF 
There are only 16 institutions that are eligible to borrow in the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). (The number of eligible institutions has 
decreased in the past year from 20 to 16.) The relatively small number makes it possible to produce 
calculations of what banks may have actually received in subsidy through these two mechanisms 
over the last year. As a first approximation, our calculations assumed that each bank borrowed from 
the Fed in proportion to its assets.  
In reality, there are large differences between these institutions in both their structure and their 
financial situation. (One of the institutions, Lehman Brothers, went bankrupt during this period.) 
However, the assumption that companies borrowed from these loan facilities in proportion to their 
assets can still provide a basis for a first approximation of the sort of subsidy that they received. 
The second step is to compare the interest rates paid by the banks with the interest rate that they 
would have paid in the private market. In the case of the PDCF, which provides overnight credit, 
the comparison interest rate is the interest rate for 1-day AA asset-backed commercial paper. For the 
TSLF, which provides loans of 28 days, the comparison is with 30-day AA asset-backed commercial 
paper. 
The appropriateness of using the interest rate on AA asset-backed securities as a reference rate will 
also vary depending on the institution. For those in solid financial shape, this rate will likely be 
somewhat higher than what they would have to pay in the private market. On the other hand, those 
whose finances are more suspect may have difficulty borrowing at this interest rate. However, the 
rate is still useful as a first approximation of the interest rate that these institutions would be forced 
to pay if they had to borrow in private financial markets instead of from the Fed. 
Table 2 shows the borrowing that each institution carried through under the PDCF and the implicit 
subsidy under the assumptions discussed above. There were periods in which the interest rate paid 
on money borrowed through the PDCF was higher than the rate on 1-day AA asset-backed 
commercial paper. In these cases, the calculation assumes no subsidy. In reality, it is reasonable to 
assume that the institutions that actually borrowed through the PDCF likely would have faced 
higher borrowing costs in the private market, otherwise they would have opted to borrow in private 
markets instead of using the Fed’s facility. However, without knowing how much each institution 
actually borrowed, it is not possible to determine the gap that actually existed between the costs they 
would have faced borrowing in the private sector and what they paid to borrow through the PDCF.  
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TABLE 2 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Borrowing and Implicit Subsidy (March 17, 2008 through February 25, 
2009) 
Primary Dealer Total Assets  (millions) 
Assumed Participation 
(millions)
Implied Subsidy 
(millions)
BNP Paribas Securities Corp. $2,494,680 $136,366 $18
Banc of America Securities LLC $1,715,746 $93,788 $12
Barclays Capital Inc. $1,227,361 $67,091 $9
Bear Sterns $395,000 $0 $0
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. $1,377,629 $75,305 $10
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. $2,187,631 $119,582 $16
Countrywide Financial $211,730 $1,627 $0
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC $1,360,680 $74,379 $10
Daiwa Securities America Inc. $29,338 $1,604 $0
Deutsche Bank Securities LLC $2,020,349 $110,438 $15
Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC $1,445,010 $11,105 $1
Goldman, Sachs & Co. $1,119,796 $61,211 $8
Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc. $144,866 $7,919 $1
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. $2,354,266 $128,691 $17
J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. $1,562,147 $85,391 $11
Lehman Brothers $691,063 $5,311 $1
Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc. $1,020,050 $7,839 $1
Mizuho Securities USA Inc. $22,921 $1,253 $0
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated $1,045,409 $57,145 $8
UBS Securities LLC $2,272,768 $124,236 $16
TOTAL $24,698,440 $1,170,281 $154
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
The calculations in Table 2 imply that relatively small subsidies were given through the PDCF. The 
gap between the interest rate on AA asset-backed 1-day commercial paper and the interest rate 
charged to investment banks or primary dealers under the PDCF was generally relatively small. If all 
banks could borrow on the private market at this rate, and each borrowed in proportion to its assets, 
then no bank or primary dealer received an implicit subsidy of more than $18 million during this 
period.  
Based on the calculations in Table 2, BNP Paribas Securities received the largest implicit subsidy of 
$18 million from the PDCF. HSBC Securities received $17 million and UBS Securities received $16 
million by this calculation. 
Many of these institutions probably would have paid considerably more than the interest rate on AA 
asset-backed commercial to borrow in private markets during this period. Furthermore, several of 
these institutions’ borrowings were disproportionate to their assets. It is likely that the institutions 
that faced the highest costs when borrowing in private markets also were the biggest users of the 
PDCF, since they would benefit most from turning to the Fed to borrow. For this reason, the 
implicit subsidy calculated as a total in Table 2 is almost certainly far smaller than the true subsidy 
the Fed gave to the investment banks and primary dealers through the PDCF.  
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Table 3 shows the borrowing by each institution through the TSLF under the same set of 
assumptions. As noted before, the interest rate used for comparisons is the interest rate on 30-day 
AA asset-backed securities. This comparison likely understates the implicit subsidy for the reasons 
noted above – the institutions that relied most on the TSLF likely faced the highest private sector 
borrowing costs. In addition, the collateral provided by these institutions may also have been of 
questionable quality, making the loans more risky, since the Fed accepted asset-backed securities as 
collateral for these loans.3  
 
TABLE 3 
Term Securities Lending Facility: Borrowing and Implicit Subsidy (March 27, 2008 through February 25, 
2009) 
Primary Dealer Total Assets (millions)
Assumed Participation 
(millions)
Implied Total Subsidy 
(millions)
BNP Paribas Securities Corp. $2,494,680 $94,203 $122
Banc of America Securities LLC $1,715,746 $64,790 $84
Barclays Capital Inc. $1,227,361 $46,347 $60
Bear Sterns $395,000 $0 $0
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. $1,377,629 $52,022 $67
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. $2,187,631 $82,609 $107
Countrywide Financial $211,730 $3,258 $4
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC $1,360,680 $51,382 $67
Daiwa Securities America Inc. $29,338 $1,108 $1
Deutsche Bank Securities LLC $2,020,349 $76,292 $99
Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC $1,445,010 $22,232 $29
Goldman, Sachs & Co. $1,119,796 $42,285 $55
Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc. $144,866 $5,470 $7
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. $2,354,266 $88,901 $115
J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. $1,562,147 $58,989 $77
Lehman Brothers $691,063 $10,632 $14
Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc. $1,020,050 $15,694 $20
Mizuho Securities USA Inc. $22,921 $866 $1
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated $1,045,409 $39,476 $51
UBS Securities LLC $2,272,768 $85,824 $111
TOTAL $24,698,440 $842,380 $1,092
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
The implied subsidies under the TSLF are somewhat larger than under the PDCF, even though the 
sum borrowed under this facility is somewhat smaller. The reason for the difference is that the gap 
between the interest rate on AA asset-backed 30-day commercial paper and the interest rate charged 
under the TSLF was typically considerably larger than the gap with 1-day commercial paper and the 
interest rate charged through the PDCF. 
Since the calculations assume that borrowing is proportional to assets, the biggest beneficiaries are 
the same as with the PDCF. The calculations in Table 3 show that BNP Paribas Securities received 
an implicit subsidy of $122 million from the TSLF. HSBC Securities received a subsidy of $115 
million by this calculation, while UBS Securities had a subsidy of $111 million. Citigroup Global 
                                                 
3 It required that institutions post assets worth 110 percent of the value of their loans in these cases.  
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Markets also gets into the $100 million subsidy group using this calculation. The total subsidy 
calculated for all the institutions under the TSLF is $1,092 million. 
As with the calculations of the subsidies in the PDCF, the calculations in Table 3 almost certainly 
substantially understate the true subsidy in the lending through the TSLF. The most troubled 
institutions may have been forced to pay interest rates that were far higher than the rate of AA asset-
backed 30-day commercial paper to borrow in the private market during this period. These 
institutions are also the ones that would have been likely to make greatest use of the TSLF. An 
institution that was in serious danger of collapse may have borrowed an amount through the TSLF 
that was grossly disproportionate to its assets and received an implicit subsidy on each dollar 
borrowed than was far larger than indicated by the calculation in the table. For example, if an 
institution’s share of the total funds borrowed was three times as large as its proportion of assets, 
and the interest rate spread was 50 percent larger than the spread using AA asset-backed commercial 
paper, then the implicit subsidy would be 4.5 times as large as the number calculated in Table 3. For 
some of the more troubled institutions eligible for this facility, it is plausible that the true subsidy 
under the TSLF could be in this range. 
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Implications of Subsidies Under Fed Loan Programs 
The calculations in the previous section dealt with just two of the ten special loan facilities 
established by the Fed in the last year. These calculations provide very general approximations of the 
sorts of subsidies that financial institutions may have received under these facilities. Without more 
information on actual borrowing, it is not possible to determine the extent to which any individual 
company may have benefited from this facility. 
Of course, there is even less ability to assess the extent of any implicit subsidies under the Fed’s 
other programs, where the number of firms with access is one or two orders of magnitude greater. 
However, it should provide cause for concern that, through these special loan facilities, the Fed is 
now able to provide substantial subsidies to the private sector by lending money at below market 
interest rates.  
The amount of loans outstanding through the various Fed facilities as of late February was $1 
trillion, more than 40 percent more than the amount of lending that is taking place through the 
TARP. While the loans made available through TARP have received considerable public attention, 
the much larger volume of loans being distributed through the Fed’s special facilities has gone 
virtually unnoticed by Congress and the media. At this point there is no reason to believe that the 
Fed has used this authority improperly, but in the absence of any public record of their lending 
practices, there is no real accountability. 
Even assuming that the Fed has been treating all firms in the same way in providing access to these 
credit facilities, there are still other policy issues that should be considered. In effect, these facilities 
are providing a subsidy from the government to the firms that opt to use them. It might be 
appropriate to demand some concessions from these firms in exchange for this subsidy.  
For example, there could be restrictions on executive compensation or annual dividend payouts at 
firms that borrow through the Fed’s special facilities. If it is too onerous to apply such restrictions 
on all users of these facilities, then it may be appropriate to apply such restrictions only to a subset 
of heavy users of these facilities, as President Obama recently proposed with the Treasury’s 
dispersion of money through its Troubled Asset Relief Program. (The appendix shows the 
compensation of the five highest paid executives for 2007 at some of the institutions that are eligible 
to receive loans through the PDCF and TSLF.)  
It is understandable that taxpayers would object to the government effectively subsidizing the 
shareholders of specific companies and their executives. If large-scale subsidies are occurring 
through the Fed’s lending facilities, then the public and Congress should be made aware of this fact. 
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Conclusion 
This paper produces a set of calculations for the subsidies implied by the Fed’s lending through the 
PDCF and TSLF, two of the ten special lending facilities created by the Fed over the last year. The 
calculations in this paper are necessarily crude approximations of the actual subsidies, since the Fed 
does not provide information on the amount borrowed by each institution. Since the number of 
institutions that qualify for these two facilities are relatively small, it is possible to get some idea of 
the order of magnitude of the subsidies involved for individual institutions.  
The calculations suggest that the subsidies for specific institutions may be quite substantial even in 
these two facilities. The full set of subsidies implied by the lending at ten facilities would be 
considerably larger. The benefit to the economy from providing liquidity through these facilities may 
mean that the implied subsidies from loans at below market rates are in the public interest. 
However, the public should be able to know the identity of the beneficiaries of these subsidies, and 
it may also want to demand some concessions in exchange for these subsidies.  
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Appendix 
TABLE A  
Compensation for Five Highest-Paid Executives at Selected Institutions Participating in the PDCF and the TSLF 
Primary 
Dealer Name of Executive Title Salary Bonus  
Other 
Compensation* Total
Kenneth D. Lewis CEO/President $1,500,000 $0 $23,344,040 $24,844,040
Liam E. McGee Divisional President $800,000 $0 $11,353,027 $12,153,027
Barbara J. Desoer President, Divisional $800,000 $0 $9,732,513 $10,532,513
Amy W. Brinkley Global Risk Executive $800,000 $0 $8,535,362 $9,335,362
Banc of 
America 
Securities, 
LLC 
Joe L. Price CFO $800,000 $0 $5,686,717 $6,486,717
Robert E. Diamond Divisional CEO/Subsidiary President $359,100 $9,336,600 $20,110 $9,715,810
Frederik Seegers Executive Director/Other Corporate Officer $1,005,480 $1,885,993 $285,844 $3,177,317
John S. Varley CEO/Director $140,049 $2,046,870 $231,081 $2,418,000
Christopher Lucas Director/Other Corporate Officer $646,380 $646,380 $193,914 $1,486,674
Barclays 
Capital, Inc. 
Marcus Agius Group Chairman of the Board $1,078,736 $0 $0 $1,078,736
Howard W. Lutnick Chairman and CEO $5,000,000 $0 $11,503,118 $16,503,118
Lee M. Amaitis Director, CEO $3,473,260 $255,735 $935,735 $4,664,730
Shaun D. Lynn President $1,505,469 $1,538,942 $671,493 $3,715,904
Stephen Merkel Executive VP, General Counsel, Secretary $925,500 $397,833 $259,986 $1,583,319
Cantor 
Fitzgerald 
Robert K. West CFO, Principal Accounting Officer $318,667 $200,000 $4,113 $522,780
Vikram S. Pandit CEO, Director $250,000 $0 $323,813 $573,813
Gary L. Crittenden CFO $403,410 $14,030,000 $4,936,096 $19,369,506
Stephen R. Volk Vice Chairman $212,500 $1,300,000 $6,085,347 $7,597,847
Lewis B. Kaden Vice Chairman $500,000 $4,000,000 $2,271,307 $6,771,307
Citigroup 
Global 
Markets, 
Inc. 
Winfried F. Bischoff Chairman of the Board $373,734 $1,950,000 $3,806,656 $6,130,390
Clemens A.H. Boersig Chairman of the Board/Director/CEO $352,381 $1,543,184 $2,420,518 $4,316,083
Josef Ackermann Chairman of the Board/Director $1,482,580 $0 $16,542,359 $18,024,939
Hermann-Josef Lamberti COO/Director $1,031,360 $0 $6,284,432 $7,315,792
Hugo Baenziger Chief Risk Officer/Director $1,031,360 $0 $6,211,455 $7,242,815
Deutsche 
Bank 
Securities, 
Inc. 
Karl-Gerhard Eick Other Corporate Officer/Director $1,180,424 $1,415,904 $1,146,214 $3,742,541
Lloyd C. Blankfein CEO/Chairman of the Board/Director $600,000 $26,985,474 $42,756,878 $70,342,352
Gary D. Cohn President/COO/Director $600,000 $26,585,474 $45,325,883 $72,511,357
Jon Winkelried President/COO/Director $600,000 $26,585,474 $44,269,952 $71,455,426
David A. Viniar Executive VP/CFO/Other Corporate Officer $600,000 $22,585,474 $35,281,662 $58,467,136
Goldman 
Sachs & Co. 
Edward C. Frost Executive VP/Chief Administrative Officer $600,000 $17,185,474 $31,273,108 $49,058,582
James Dimon CEO/Chairman of the Board/President $1,000,000 $14,500,000 $12,297,275 $27,797,275
William T. Winters Co-CEO of the Investment Bank $564,379 $4,900,000 $15,734,965 $21,199,344
Steven D. Black Co-CEO of the Investment Bank $400,000 $4,900,000 $15,564,455 $20,864,455
James E. Staley CEO, Divisional $400,000 $8,800,000 $7,547,564 $16,747,564
J.P. Morgan 
Securities, 
Inc. 
Michael J. Cavanagh CFO $500,000 $3,750,000 $4,036,339 $8,286,339
John J. Mack CEO/Chairman of the Board/Director $800,000 $0 $802,458 $1,602,458
Thomas Colm Kelleher CFO/Executive VP $339,603 $6,929,843 $13,746,243 $21,015,689
Robert W. Scully Other Corporate Officer $500,000 $5,075,000 $9,636,212 $15,211,212
Gary G. Lynch Executive VP $300,000 $6,308,375 $5,291,589 $11,899,964
Morgan 
Stanley & 
Co., Inc. 
Thomas R. Nides Executive VP/Chief Administrative Officer $300,000 $3,936,260 $2,096,888 $6,333,148
TOTAL $34,074,372 $219,574,289 $408,446,721 $662,095,381
Source: Forbes Magazine, Corporate Executives and Directors, available at http://people.forbes.com/search 
*This includes long-term incentive payouts, restricted stock awards, security underlying options, option awards, and all other forms 
of executive compensation. 
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Explanation of Calculations 
Table 1 – Special Lending Facilities of the Federal Reserve 
Figures for total amount outstanding at the PDCF, TAF, AMLF, and credit extended to American 
International Group, Inc. are made available through the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet (at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/hist/h41hist6.pdf). Portfolio holdings of the CPFF, 
MMIFF, and Maiden Lane LLC are also made available through the Fed’s balance sheet (at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/hist/h41hist5.pdf). For the TSLF, auction results 
within the last 28 days were summed together to determine the total amount of loans outstanding. 
As of February 25, 2009, the TALF had not begun to make loans. 
Table 2 – Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
Loans through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility are charged with an interest rate equal to the 
Federal Reserve’s primary credit rate (available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Build.aspx?rel=H15). In order to calculate an 
implied subsidy through this facility, the Fed’s primary credit rate was compared with interest rates 
on overnight AA asset-backed commercial paper (available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/). If the difference was negative, the implied subsidy 
was assumed to be zero. If the difference was positive, it was divided by 52 to adjust for time period 
and then multiplied by the weekly averages listed by the Fed. Once these figures were calculated, 
they were attributed to the participating investment banks in proportion to their total listed assets as 
of 2007 (available through each firm’s balance sheet). Firms that had become bankrupt or insolvent 
during some or all of the time period were assumed to have zero participation. 
Table 3 – Term Securities Lending Facility 
Through the Term Securities Lending Facility Schedule II auctions, investment banks are able to 
swap any investment-grade debt securities, including mortgage-backed securities, in exchange for 
Treasury general collateral. Banks submit offers for the Treasury collateral, and the lowest accepted 
bid rate (the stop-out rate) becomes the interest rate charged to all accepted offers. To calculate an 
implied subsidy, the stop-out rate and the rates on 4-week Treasury bills were subtracted from the 
rates on 30-day AA asset-backed commercial paper. This rate was then divided by 12 to adjust for 
the maturity period of the transaction and then multiplied by the individual auction results listed by 
the Federal Reserve. Once the subsidy amounts were estimated, they were attributed to participating 
investment banks in the same manner as Table 2, in proportion to their total assets. 
